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Shearer: Miranda Warnings Sufficient to Inform Defendant of Sixth Amendmen

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Right To Counsel-Miranda
Warnings Sufficient To Inform Defendant Of Sixth
Amendment Right To Counsel For
Postindictment Interrogations.
__

U.S.

__,

Patterson v. Illinois,
108 S. Ct. 2389, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1988).

On the morning of August 21, 1983, police officers discovered the body of
James Jackson, the victim of a gang-related murder.' That afternoon,
Tyrone Patterson was arrested on charges of mob action, informed of his
Miranda rights, and questioned about the murder.2 On August 23, while
still in police custody, Patterson learned from police officers that he had been
indicted for Jackson's murder. 3 Patterson attempted to volunteer information regarding the murder, but was immediately interrupted by a police officer who read him his Miranda rights.4 Patterson signed a form waiving his5
Miranda rights and proceeded to make inculpatory statements to the police.
That afternoon, the Illinois Assistant State's Attorney confirmed that Patterson understood and thereby properly waived his Miranda rights prior to
making his earlier statement.6 The attorney then re-explained those warnings and obtained a second waiver form signed by Patterson before allowing
him to make a second confession. 7 Patterson was convicted of murder in the
1. Patterson v. Illinois, -

U.S. _,

.,

108 S. Ct. 2389, 2392, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 269

(1988).
2. Id. Patterson agreed to answer questions pertaining to a fight with a rival gang but
denied any knowledge of Jackson's death. Id. Patterson was held in custody while police
continued their investigation. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)(listing required warnings
given by police). Patterson was handed a form listing the five required warnings which he and
the officer read together. Patterson, - U.S. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 2392, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 269.
5. Patterson v. Illinois, - U.S.._, ..- , 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2392-93, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 270
(1988). Patterson initialed each of the individual warnings and then signed the form. Id.
Patterson then described, in detail, his involvement in the murder. Id. Patterson conceded
"that he was informed of his right to counsel to the extent required by. . . Miranda v. Arizona." Patterson, - U.S. at - n.1, 108 S. Ct. at 2392 n.1, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 269 n.l.
6. Patterson, __ U.S. at , 108 S. Ct. at 2393, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 270.
7. Patterson,- U.S. at , 108 S. Ct. at 2393, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 270. Additionally, Assistant State's Attorney Smith informed Patterson that he was working with the police and was
not Patterson's attorney. Id. Patterson told Smith that he was making the confession freely,
had not received any promises or threats and had been allowed to eat and rest while in custody. People v. Thomas, 507 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Il1. 1987)(lower court proceeding discussing
facts of case).
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Illinois trial court.8 The court admitted Patterson's inculpatory statements
into evidence, holding that the Miranda warnings sufficiently informed him
of his right to counsel during postindictment questioning.9 The Illinois Appellate Court and Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. 0 The United
States Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari to decide whether Miranda
warnings are sufficient to inform a defendant of his sixth amendment right to
counsel for postindictment interrogation."' Held - Affirmed. Miranda
of his sixth amendment right to
warnings are sufficient to inform a defendant
12
interrogations.
postindictment
for
counsel
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part,
that "[n]o person shall ...be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."' 3 The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 14 established a clear set of warnings designed to protect a suspect's
fifth amendment 15 right to be free from coerced self-incrimination.1 6 As a
prerequisite to custodial interrogation, a suspect must be warned that he has
the right: 1) to an attorney; 2) to have that attorney present during questioning; 3) to have an attorney appointed if he cannot afford one; 4) to remain
silent; and 5) that anything he says may be used against him in subsequent

8. Patterson v. Illinois,
(1988).
9. Id.

-

U.S...,

_, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2393, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 270

10. Id.; People v. Thomas, 507 N.E.2d 843, 849 (Ill. 1987); People v. Patterson, 488
N.E.2d 1283, 1289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
11. Patterson v. Illinois, - U.S. ._, __,108 S. Ct. 227, 227, 98 L. Ed. 2d 186, 186
(1987)(order granting certiorari).
108 S. Ct. 2389, 2399, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 277
12. Patterson v. Illinois, - U.S. __,___,
(1988).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). "Miranda" collectively refers to four cases chosen at random
from nearly eighty cases that presented the same issue during the 1965 term. Note, Proposed
Requirementsfor Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 363,
376 n.82 (1982). The other three cases are: Vignera v. New York, No. 760; Westover v. United
States, No. 761; and California v. Stewart, No. 584. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment has previously been applied to a
confession scenario. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897)(defendant's involuntary statements excluded). While Bram has been criticized by commentators, it was utilized by
the United States Supreme Court in its analysis of valid confessions until 1966. Note, Proposed
Requirementsfor Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 363,
376 nn. 84 & 86. (1982). In 1964, the fifth amendment was first held applicable to state trials.
See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964)(fifth amendment guarantee binding on all states).
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966). The Court held that "[w]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any
significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized." Id. at 478. For a detailed account of the history behind Miranda, see generally L.
BAKER, MIRANDA:

CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS
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criminal proceedings.17 The rationale underlying these warnings is the
awareness that custodial interrogations are inherently coercive and likely to
induce incriminating statements."8 Thus, the accused needs the protection
of counsel during custodial interrogation to protect the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination. 9 Unlike the prophylactic protection given
to the fifth amendment right once an individual has been placed in custody,
the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches once the government's role
turns from investigator to prosecutor. E°
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall.., have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." 2 The right to counsel originally applied to the
trial phase of a criminal prosecution.2 2 In 1964, the sixth amendment right
to counsel was extended to protect the accused from government attempts to
deliberately elicit incriminating statements after the initiation of formal

17. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. The Court stated that "procedural safeguards" were required to protect a suspect's rights. Id. at 467-69. If the defendant indicates that he wants to
remain silent or to have an attorney present, the interrogation must cease. Id. at 474.
18. Id. at 470. See generally Note, Mirandaand its Progeny -Application and Limitation
of the Warren Court's Legacy, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 232, 239-43 (1969)(Miranda intended to
diminish use of interrogation as primary tool in criminal justice arsenal).
19. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470 (fifth amendment requires protection through counsel
prior to and during questioning). Miranda's entitlement to counsel is merely a prophylactic
protection for the fifth amendment right to be free from coerced self-incrimination. See generally Tomkovicz, Standardsfor Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71
IOWA L. REV. 975, 988 n.50 (1986)(Miranda warnings safeguard fifth amendment right to be
free from compulsory self-incrimination).
20. Compare New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)(Miranda warnings protect
right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination in custodial setting) with Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)(return of formal charges marks starting point of adversary proceedings at which point government commits itself to prosecute and sixth amendment right to
counsel attaches).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963)(sixth amendment right to counsel applicable to state trials). Clarence Earl Gideon, indigent and unable to secure counsel,
requested that the Florida trial court appoint an attorney for his defense in the felony proceedings against him. Id. at 337. This request was denied because Florida only appointed counsel
in capital cases. Gideon made an opening statement, cross examined the prosecution's witnesses, presented witnesses in his defense, and made a closing argument, as skillfully as could
be expected of a layman. Id. His conviction was reversed by the United States Supreme Court
which held that the right to counsel was fundamental to a fair trial in either federal or state
court. Id. at 344-45; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938)(sixth amendment
requires appointed counsel for indigent defendants in federal felony trials); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-70 (1932)(fourteenth amendment due process clause guarantees indigent defendant right to counsel during trial for capital crimes during trial). But see Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979)(appointed counsel not required at trial where indigent defendant
not sentenced to imprisonment).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 20 [2022], No. 2, Art. 9

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:473

charges.2 3 The United States Supreme Court reasoned that the assistance of
counsel at trial would be of little value if the indicted defendant was denied
counsel at a critical pretrial period such as postindictment police interrogation.24 The right to counsel was later expanded to encompass pretrial phases
that were deemed "critical stages." 25 The United States Supreme Court has
defined a "critical stage" as any confrontation between the defendant and
the government in which an attorney is needed to safeguard the right to a
fair trial.2 6 This definition was later qualified by the Court when it stated

23. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)(deliberate postindictment elic-

itation of incriminating statements outside retained counsel's presence violates sixth amendment guarantee to counsel). The Court held that the government's deliberate elicitation of
incriminating statements from an indicted suspect who had been released on bail without retained counsel, violated the fifth and sixth amendments. Id. Massiah made incriminating
statements in response to questions from co-defendant Colson, who was cooperating with the
police. Id. at 202-03. Colson allowed the police to install an electronic transmitter in his
automobile which enabled the police to monitor the conversation in question. Id.
24. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204-05. The Court extended sixth amendment protection to
custodial interrogations in Escobedo v. Illinois, following the analysis in Massiah. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486-90 (1964)(examination of sixth amendment precedents).
The Court's holding was limited to the facts of the case:
"We hold ...that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken
into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied 'the Assistance
of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment ...."
Id. at 490-91. For further discussion on the attachment of the right to counsel, see generally
Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the ConstitutionalPremises Underlying
the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1979)(initiation of adversary proceedings as threshold requirement to right to counsel); White, Rhode Island v. Innis, The Significance of a Suspect's Assertion of his Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 57-61

(1979)(examination of triggering events for attachment of sixth amendment right to counsel).
For a detailed discussion of the development of the sixth amendment right to counsel before
Escobedo and Massiah, see generally Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v.
United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47, 49-53 (1964)(historical review of
sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel prior to 1964).
25. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967)(defining critical stage). The
right to counsel attaches at various pretrial stages, such as preliminary hearings, delayed sentencing hearings, initial appearances before a magistrate and pretrial arraignments. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970)(preliminary hearings); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,
135-36 (1967)(delayed sentencing hearing); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963)(initial
appearance before magistrate); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961)(pretrial arraignment). See generally W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS

(1972)(extension of sixth amendment to pretrial proceedings); Tomkovicz, Standardsfor Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 980-82 (1986)(historical expansion of sixth amendment).
26. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)(critical stage defined as confron-
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that the sixth amendment right to counsel will not be extended to defendants
prior to the initiation of formal criminal charges at a preliminary hearing or
arraignment, or by the return of an indictment or information.2 7 Thus, suspects questioned prior to the return of formal charges are not afforded the
same sixth amendment protection as postindictment defendants,2" though
they may be protected by other constitutional rights.29 At all times, however, a suspect or defendant may waive these rights if the waiver is knowingly and intelligently made.3 °

tation which requires presence of counsel to assure defendant's interests protected consistently
with adversary theory of prosecution). For examples of critical stages, see Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454, 469-71 (198 l)(psychiatric examinations used to establish defendant as dangerous and
deserving of death penalty); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980)(deliberate postindictment elicitation of incriminating statements via undercover government agent); Moore v.
Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 229-30 (1977)(eyewitness identification at preliminary hearing); Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404-05 (1977)(deliberate postarraignment elicitation of incriminating statements); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 271-74 (1967)(postindictment eyewitness
identification). However, not all stages of a criminal proceeding are deemed critical. See
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). Where the defendant is not present and,
therefore, not subjected to prejudicial conditions, the right to counsel does not attach. See
United States v, Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317 (1973)(photographic identification where defendant
not present is not critical stage). The Court has held that the right to counsel does not apply to
scientific examinations of fingerprints, hair, and blood samples because the accused could confront the government's evidence at trial through cross-examination. See United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)(discussing situations in which sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766 (1966)(taking blood
sample not critical stage). See generally J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AcCUSED: TRIAL RIGHTS §§ 23-31 (1974)(discussing right to counsel at different stages in criminal proceedings); Stephens, The Assistance of Counsel and the Warren Court: Post-Gideon
Developments in Perspective, 74 DICK. L. REV. 193, 199-212 (1970)(attachment of right to
counsel depends on stage of proceeding).
27. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). The Court has refused to extend sixth
amendment protection to situations that arise before the initiation of adversarial proceedings.
See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986)(custodial interrogation prior to return of
formal charges not sufficient to trigger sixth amendment counsel right); see also United States
v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984)(preindictment administrative detention insufficient to
give rise to right to counsel under sixth amendment).
28. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428-432 (1986)(failure of police to inform defendant that attorney had been retained by third party on his behalf did not violate sixth
amendment right to counsel where defendant not arraigned); see also United States v. Gouveia,
467 U.S. 179, 192 (1984)(convicted prisoners held in administrative detention during investigation of murdered inmate not deprived of sixth amendment right to counsel until return of
indictment); Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690 (preindictment eyewitness identification does not violate
sixth amendment right to counsel).
29. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966)(fifth amendment comprehends
right to attorney during custodial interrogation); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02
(1967)(unnecessarily suggestive line-up conducive to irreparable mistaken identity violates
fourteenth amendment due process clause).
30. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76 (adopting intentional abandonment standard for
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Statements deliberately elicited from the accused outside of the presence
of counsel may be used at trial only if the accused has validly waived his
right to counsel. 3 Because the assistance of counsel is fundamental to a fair
adjudication,32 waiver of that right is strictly scrutinized.3 3 Courts presume
that the accused does not desire to waive the right 34 and require the govern-

ment to show that the defendant intentionally abandoned or relinquished his
right to counsel.35 In analyzing such a waiver, the courts must discern
whether it was made voluntarily, 36 if the defendant fully comprehended the
nature of the right and if the defendant understood the consequences of
abandoning that right. 37 In doing so, the court may consider the circum-

fifth amendment waiver of counsel); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)(sixth amendment waiver described as intentional abandonment of known right).
31. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 (1986)(statements made after attachment of
sixth amendment right require same protection as those protected by fifth amendment); see
also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404-05 (1977)(postindictment statement deliberately
elicited by police officer outside presence of retained counsel held inadmissible in absence of
valid waiver); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (required warnings and waiver are prerequisites to
admissibility of defendant's statements); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512
(1954)(trial without intelligent and competent waiver of right to counsel bars conviction).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)(pretrial counsel necessary
to preserve right to fair trial); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964)(pretrial right
to counsel critical to effective representation at trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343
(1963)(right to counsel fundamental to fair trial); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57
(1933)(period from arraignment to trial critical for defense).
33. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404 (strict standard for evaluating waiver of right to counsel
applies to critical pretrial stages and trial of criminal prosecution); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 238-40 (1973)(waiver of right to counsel at trial strictly scrutinized); cf. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (government's heavy burden of proving waiver scrutinized in light of
high standards).
34. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); see also Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1,
4 (1966)(presumption against waiver of constitutional rights); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 70-72 (1942)(presumption against waiver of fundamental rights); Johnson, 304 U.S. at
464 (presumption against acquiescence in loss of fundamental rights); cf Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)(defendant's silence will not give rise to presumption of waiver).
35. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)(defining waiver); see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)(waiver of sixth amendment right requires both comprehension
and intentional relinquishment); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (defendant's preinterrogation
waiver of counsel must be knowing and intelligent).
36. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)(relinquishment of right must be
free from deliberate coercion or intimidation); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471 n.16
(1981)(waiver of assistance of counsel must be voluntary); Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404 (waiver of
counsel ineffective where record reflects defendant coerced into making incriminating statements); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941)(defendant deprived of constitutional
right where waiver not voluntary); cf. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (defendant may waive right to
counsel provided waiver made voluntarily).
37. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (totality of circumstances examined to determine if comprehension was attained to waive right to counsel).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol20/iss2/9

6

Shearer: Miranda Warnings Sufficient to Inform Defendant of Sixth Amendmen

1989]

CASENOTE

stances and facts of the case,"8 as well as the education,39 background,' ° and
age of the defendant. 4 ' While the existence of the constitutional right to
counsel does not depend on the defendant's request,4 2 it is a factor to be

considered in analyzing subsequent incriminating responses to police questioning.4" Applying these factors, the same standard of knowing and intelli-

38. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (valid waiver based upon facts and circumstances of case);
see also Estelle, 451 U.S. at 471-72 n.16 (knowing and intelligent waiver depends on circumstances and facts of each case); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375 (1979)(reaffirming
factors set forth in Zerbst); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403 (1977)(validity of waiver of
counsel requires application of constitutional principles to facts of case); Von Moltke v. Gillies,
332 U.S. 708, 723-25 (1948)(trial judge must investigate circumstances surrounding defendant's waiver of right to counsel).
39. See United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.)(defendant's status of college
graduate and two year completion of law school supported finding defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived right to counsel), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 962 (1984); United States v. Bailey,
675 F.2d 1292, 1302 (D.C.Cir. 1982)(valid waiver of counsel supported by evidence defendant
studied law in prison); Bennett v. State of Miss., 523 F.2d 802, 803-04 (5th Cir. 1975)(defendant's waiver of appellate counsel ineffective in light of third grade education); LaPlante v.
Wolff, 505 F.2d 780, 781-83 (8th Cir. 1974)(trial court's explanation to eighteen year-old English-speaking defendant with ninth grade education supported valid waiver of counsel).
40. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)(intelligent waiver of counsel does
not require defendant have skill and experience of trained lawyer); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942)(defendant's professional occupation as attorney considered factor in
analyzing waiver of counsel); Fillippini v. Ristaino, 585 F.2d 1163, 1167 (1st Cir. 1978)(validity of written waiver of counsel supported by previous representation by counsel and past
criminal record).
41. See United States v. Williamson, 806 F.2d 216, 220 (10th Cir. 1986)(eighteen yearold's waiver of legal assistance held valid where court explained right to counsel, charges and
punishment); McLemore v. Cubley, 569 F.2d 940, 940-41 (5th Cir. 1978)(assistance of counsel
not prerequisite to valid waiver of counsel by juvenile in delinquency proceeding); McBride v.
Jacobs, 247 F.2d 595, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1957)(totality of circumstances examined to determine
whether minor capable of valid waiver of counsel).
42. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404-05 (right to counsel not dependent on defendant's request); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962)(constitutional right to attorney exists
independent of defendant's request); cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966)(failure
to request counsel does not constitute waiver).
43. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 n.6 (1986). Jackson requested counsel at his
arraignment, invoking his sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 628. Before counsel was
actually appointed, Jackson was interrogated and made incriminating statements which were
used against him at trial. Id. The Court stated that "we construe the defendant's request for
counsel as an extremely important fact in considering the validity of a subsequent waiver in
response to police-initiated interrogation." Id. at 633 n.6. This footnote, however, conflicts
with the Court's holding that police initiated interrogations, conducted after the accused invokes his sixth amendment right, invalidates any waiver given for that interrogation session.
Id. at 636. Justice Rehnquist disagreed, arguing that the policies behind Edwards have no
application in a sixth amendment context. Id. at 637-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist asserted that Edwards merely enhances the rights conferred by Miranda by providing an additional layer of protection to the fifth amendment. Id. at 639. Since there is no
evidence that the police routinely violate the sixth amendment right to counsel, a prophylactic
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gent waiver applies to both fifth and sixth amendment contexts."
Miranda provided for waiver of the Court's proposed warnings based on
the "knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege" standard previously set forth in sixth amendment cases.45
While a majority of the lower federal courts have held that Miranda warnings are sufficient to inform the accused of his sixth amendment right to
counsel,46 the Supreme Court had not yet answered this question.4 7
rule is unnecessary. Id. Edwards, a fifth amendment case, established the rule that once a
defendant has requested the assistance of counsel, further interrogation is prohibited until an
attorney has been made available, unless the accused initiates further conversations with the
police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). For an in depth analysis of Michigan v. Jackson, see Note, CriminalProcedure- Right to Counsel/Waivers: Michigan v. Jackson, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 807, 807-17 (1987).
44. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)(adopting Zerbst sixth amendment
standard for fifth amendment waiver of counsel); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938)(adopting intentional relinquishment of known right as standard of waiver for sixth
amendment).
45. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (adopting standard set forth in Zerbst). The Court noted
that the record must reflect that the "accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer." Id. One commentator has suggested that any defendant who
waives the right to counsel acts unintelligently. See Recent Cases, CriminalLaw - Confessions - Government Can Satisfy its Burden of Proving Waiver of Miranda Rights by Showing
Warnings Given, Signed Waiver and Proof of Defendant's Capacity to Understand the Warnings, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1075 n.47 (1973)(defendant should not waive rights until situation evaluated dispassionately). If an interrogation continues without the assistance of
counsel, a heavy burden is imposed upon the state to show that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his fifth amendment rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. See generally Note,
Intoxicated Confessions: A New Haven in Miranda, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1280 (1968)(imposition of heavy burden on state intended to diminish state's advantage in conducting inherently
coercive interrogations).
46. See, e.g., Blasingame v. Estelle, 604 F.2d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 1979)(defendant's postarraignment waiver of Miranda warnings sufficiently indicated voluntary waiver of counsel);
United States v. Monti, 557 F.2d 899, 904 (1st Cir. 1977)(Miranda warnings sufficiently informed postindictment defendant of right to counsel); Moore v. Wolfe, 495 F.2d 35, 36-37 (8th
Cir. 1974)(incriminating statement admissible because Miranda warnings enabled defendant to
make knowing and intelligent waiver of appointed counsel); United States v. Cobbs, 481 F.2d
196, 199-200 (3rd Cir.)(postindictment interrogation constitutionally permissible outside presence of appointed counsel if defendant waives Miranda warnings), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980
(1973); United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1352-53 (7th Cir.)(defendant must fully understand Miranda warnings to make knowing and intelligent waiver of sixth amendment counsel), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972); Coghlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371, 372 (9th
Cir.)(Miranda warnings inform defendant of right to counsel such that confession obtained
outside presence of appointed counsel is admissible), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968). The
second circuit is alone among the federal appellate courts in support of a higher standard. See
United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1153 (2d Cir. 1980)(requiring federal judicial officer
to explain content and significance of right to counsel). Commentators, however, favor a
higher standard for sixth amendment waivers. See, e.g., Tomkovicz, Standardsfor Invocation
and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 1054-1059 (1986)(explicit sixth amendment warnings required to insure knowing and intelligent waiver); Note,
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In Patterson v. Illinois,4 8 the United States Supreme Court held that Mi-

randa warnings are sufficient to warn a suspect of his sixth amendment right
to counsel for postindictment interrogation purposes. 49 The Court conceded
that Patterson had a sixth amendment right to counsel by virtue of his postindictment status,5 ° but held that his failure to ask for an attorney distinguished his case from those in which the accused actually invoked the right
to counsel by requesting legal assistance. 5" The majority found that Patterson made a valid, "knowing and intelligent" waiver of his sixth amendment
right.52 This finding was based on a two part analysis that asked first if the
accused was aware of his right to have an attorney present during questioning, and second, if the accused was aware of the consequences of his act."
Addressing the first prong, the Court insisted that Miranda warnings adequately encompass the essential elements of the sixth amendment's guaran-

Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: Standardsfor Knowing and Intelligent Pretrial Waivers,
60 B.U.L. REV. 738, 757-763 (1980)(accused must be informed of disadvantages and dangers
of waiving sixth amendment counsel in relation to particular critical stage encountered); Note,
Proposed Requirements for Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 363, 381-91 (1982)(suggesting assistance of counsel as prerequisite to waiver).
47. See, e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 635-36 n. 10 (1986)(reserving judgment
on relationship between fifth and sixth amendment waivers); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
428 n.2 (1986)(relationship between fifth and sixth amendment waivers not raised); Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405-06 (1977) (reserving question of sixth amendment waiver).
48. _ U.S. _, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1988)(White, J., delivering majority
opinion).
49. Patterson v. Illinois, - U.S. - -, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2399, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 277
(1988). The Court limited the application of this holding to postindictment questioning, noting that a waiver of the right is binding on the accused until he desires to revoke the waiver.
Id. at __ n.5, 108 S. Ct. at 2395 n.5, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 272 n.5.
50. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2393, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 270; see also Michigan v. Jackson, 475
U.S. 625, 629 (1986)(sixth amendment guarantees assistance of counsel at postarraignment
interrogation); Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398-401 (accused entitled to attorney after initiation of
adversarial proceedings); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-07 (1964)(critical stage
after arraignment requires counsel).
51. Patterson, - U.S. at -,
108 S. Ct. at 2394, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 271. A request for
counsel would have precluded further questioning. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636 (sixth amendment requires postindictment interrogation cease once defendant requests counsel); cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)(interrogation must stop if defendant invokes right
to counsel). But cf Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1981)(defendant's uncounseled
statements admissible after invocation of right to counsel where defendant initiated
communication).
52. Patterson, - U.S. at 108 S. Ct. at 2397, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275. The Court stated
that Patterson read and signed the waiver form, indicating some level of voluntariness, and
that Patterson was unable to recommend any meaningful additional warnings which would
have enabled him to make a better decision. Id. at __ nn.7-8, 108 S. Ct. at 2396 nn.7-8, 101 L.
Ed. 2d at 274 nn.7-8.
53. Id. at __, 108 S. Ct. at 2395, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 273; see also Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 421 (1986)(discussing two-part waiver analysis).
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tee of counsel thereby apprising the defendant of his right to consult an
attorney. 54 Addressing the second prong, the majority reasoned that Patterson was made aware of the consequences of his waiver because law enforcement officials warned him that his subsequent statements could be used
against him." The Court also rejected Patterson's argument that the judicially created fifth amendment right to counsel was a "lesser" right that required a lower standard of waiver than the accused's sixth amendment
right.5 6 The Court found little difference in the role of counsel during custodial interrogation and postindictment questioning" and concluded that Miranda warnings, already sufficient for fifth amendment interrogations,
adequately informed a defendant of his sixth amendment right to counsel.5"
Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that once adversarial proceedings
commence, the defendant should not have to request the assistance of counsel where that right is constitutionally granted.5 9 He further insisted that
interrogation should be prohibited until counsel had been consulted, unless
the accused initiated the conversation.' Justice Blackmun would extend the
rule announced in Edwards v. Arizona, prohibiting questioning by police after the defendant requested counsel, to all postindictment defendants,
whether or not they actually invoke the right to counsel. 6 '
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, 62 argued that the state's actions were
64
unethical 63 due to the government's role as both advisor and prosecutor.
Additionally, Justice Stevens urged that the initiation of formal criminal
proceedings so significantly increased the need for safeguards between an

54. Patterson, -

U.S. at

-

108 S. Ct. at 2395, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 273 (Mirandawarnings

make defendant aware of right to consult attorney during questioning).

55. Id. at __, 108 S. Ct. at 2394-97, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 272-75.
56. Id. at __,108 S. Ct. at 2397-99, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275-76. Although there is a difference in the two rights, neither is "superior." Id. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 2397, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275.
57.
tion not
58.
59.

See id. at -..., 108 S. Ct. at 2398, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 276 (value of counsel at interrogasubstantially increased by return of formal charges).
Id. at __, 108 S. Ct. at 2399, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 277.
Patterson,__ U.S. at __ 108 S. Ct. at 2399, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 277-78 (Blackmun, J.,

dissenting).
60. Id. at

-,

108 S. Ct. at 2399, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 277-78.

61. Id. at __, 108 S. Ct. at 2399, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 277-78; see also Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)(interrogation prohibited after defendant requests assistance of
counsel).
62. See Patterson, - U.S. at .- , 108 S. Ct. at 2399, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 278 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
63. See id. at _ n.1, 108 S. Ct. at 2399 n.1, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 278 n.1 (citing ABA provisions prohibiting communications with a party known to be represented by another attorney).
64. Id. at __, 108 S. Ct. at 2404, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 283-84. The dissent reasoned that the
state's "advice" on legal rights and the consequences involved in a waiver of those rights could

mislead the accused as to the adversarial nature of the proceedings, "color" the advice offered,
and give the appearance of impropriety. Id.
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accused and the state that the ability to waive an accused's sixth amendment
65
Jusright should not be permitted after mere receipt of Miranda warnings.
tice Stevens also insisted that the pretrial role of counsel was equally important as representation at trial, contrary to the majority's limited view of the
role counsel plays at an interrogation.6 6
The Patterson Court was correct in holding that Miranda warnings inform
the accused of his sixth amendment right to counsel for postindictment interrogations.6 7 The Miranda warnings sufficiently inform the accused of his
right to counsel 68 and of the consequences when that right is waived, 69 thus
allowing the defendant to make a knowing and intelligent waiver.7 ° Further,
although the accused has a sixth amendment right to counsel after the initiation of adversary proceedings, the accused must exercise that right to bring
the full weight of the sixth amendment into force. 7 Finally, while the fifth
and sixth amendment rights to counsel are different, the sixth amendment
right is not superior and does not require a higher standard of waiver in the

108 S. Ct. 2389, 2400-02, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261,
65. See Patterson v. Illinois, - U.S.., -_,
279-81 (1988). As an example, the dissent noted that certain methods of eliciting information
such as electronic surveillance or undercover agents may be acceptable prior to, but not after,
the initiation of formal proceedings. Id. at __ n.3, 108 S. Ct. at 2402 n.3, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 281
n.3.

66. See id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2403, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 282-83. Relying on precedents set in
Escobedo, Wade, and Spano, the dissent stressed the need for pretrial assistance of counsel,
insisting that the right to counsel at trial would be of little value if such assistance were not
available before that trial. Id. at - n.5, 108 S. Ct. at 2403 n.5, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 282 n.5; see
also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967)(counsel at trial ineffective if denied pretrial); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1964)(right to counsel at trial meaningless if
conviction assured through pretrial interrogation); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 325-26
(1959)(Douglas, J., concurring) (deprivation of pretrial counsel more harmful than denial of
counsel during trial). Conversely, the majority sees the role of counsel at questioning as limited, essentially advising the defendant to answer questions or remain silent. Patterson v. Illinois, _ U.S. _, _ n.6, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2395-96 n.6, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 273 n.6 (1988).
67. Cf Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985)(Miranda warnings inform accused of
right to counsel).
68. Id.
69. Cf United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188-89 (1977) (grand jury witness
cannot complain when testimony used against him if previously warned of right to remain
silent).
70. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)(valid sixth amendment waiver requires intentional relinquishment of known right); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421
(1986)(defendant must be aware of nature of right and consequences of abandoning that right
for waiver to be valid).
71. Cf Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 631, 633-35 (1986)(sixth amendment violated
when postindictment interrogation continues when defendant requests counsel); Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)(state obligated to afford defendant sixth amendment protection once right invoked).
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context of interrogation.72
The Miranda warnings given to Patterson sufficiently apprised him of his
right to counsel. 73 To elicit an effective waiver for sixth amendment postindictment questioning, the defendant must know he has a right to counsel's
presence at questioning and know the consequences of his decision to abandon that right. 74 The first prong of this test was satisfied when Patterson
was apprised of his rights twice by state officials, 75 and also when he personally initialed each of the Miranda warnings. 76 The accused was told that he
had the right to speak with a lawyer, to have that lawyer present during
questioning, and to have a lawyer appointed if he could not afford one.77
These warnings thus conveyed the "sum and substance" of the sixth amendment's right to counsel. 78 The same reasoning applies with equal force in the
second prong of the waiver analysis: when the accused has been warned that
anything he says can be used against him at trial, he has been warned of the
ultimate adverse consequence of making an uncounseled statement. 79 Because the accused has been informed of the consequences of making an un-

72. Patterson v. Illinois, - U.S.._,-,
108 S. Ct. 2389, 2397, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 275
(1988).
73. See id. at ._, 108 S. Ct. at 2399, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 277 (1988)(Miranda warnings elicit
essence of sixth amendment right to counsel); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985)(Miranda warnings inform accused of right to counsel). The majority's holding does not imply
that Miranda warnings will suffice in all sixth amendment situations because the sixth amendment right to counsel is broader than the fifth amendment right protected by Miranda. Patterson, - U.S. at __ n.9, 108 S. Ct. at 2397 n.9, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275 n.9; see also Jackson, 475
U.S. at 632 (sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at every critical stage while fifth
amendment right to counsel requires both custody and interrogation).
74. Patterson, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2395, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 272. The essential
inquiry into the validity of a waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel at postindictment
questioning is whether the accused was aware of his right to an attorney during questioning
and of the consequences of abandoning that right. Id. Compare Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (fifth
amendment waiver requires awareness of right and consequences of decision to waive same
right) with Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (waiver of sixth amendment right requires the intentional
relinquishment of known right).
75. Patterson _ U.S. _, 108 S. Ct. at 2392, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 269. Upon learning that he
had been indicted, Patterson began to volunteer information regarding the murder. Id. A
police officer immediately interrupted, handing Patterson a Miranda waiver form. Id. Patterson read the warnings with the officer, initialed each warning, and then signed the form before
making his confession. Id. at __, 108 S. Ct. at 2392-93, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 269-70.
76. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2393, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 270. The Illinois Assistant State's
Attorney reviewed Patterson's initial waiver form with him, ensuring that he understood his
rights. Id. The State's attorney then repeated the entire waiver procedure, securing another
signed waiver form. Id.
77. Patterson v. Illinois, - U.S ....
108 S. Ct. 2389, 2395, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 273
(1988).
78. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2395, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 273; cf Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
316 (1985)(Miranda warnings inform defendant of right to attorney).
79. Patterson, _ U.S. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 2395, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 273; cf United States v.
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counseled statement and acknowledged the meaning of this right by waiving
counsel's presence at questioning, it can only be assumed that the defendant
understood the effect of his actions. 80 Additional warnings or formulations
to inform the defendant of the consequences involved with waiver are not
required .8 The state is not required to show complete understanding of the
defendant's psychological appreciation of all consequences resulting from
the waiver.8 2
Although the sixth amendment right to counsel arises after the initiation
of adversarial proceedings, 3 the accused must invoke the right to enjoy its
full protection.8 4 While requesting or retaining counsel is sufficient to trig-

Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188-89 (1977)(grand jury witness cannot complain when testimony
used against him if previously warned of right to remain silent).
80. Patterson, - U.S. at _ 108 S. Ct. at 2395-96, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 273.
81. Id. at _ n.8, 108 S. Ct. at 2396-97 n.8, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 274 n.8 (rejecting second
circuit requirement of additional warnings and explanation by neutral judicial officer). It is
questionable whether there are any additional warnings that would more clearly inform the
accused of his right to have counsel present during questioning or apprise him of the consequences of a waiver of that right. Id. at - n.7, 108 S. Ct. at 2396 n.7, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 274 n.7.
Patterson was unable to articulate additional information which would increase his understanding of right to counsel. Id. at - n.7, 108 S. Ct. at 2396 n.7, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 274 n.7. But
see United States v. Calabrass, 458 F. Supp. 964, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(additional warnings
must be tailored to facts and circumstances of each case).
82. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 575-77 (1987)(Miranda waiver not invalidated
by defendant's mistaken belief that interrogation would focus on one crime); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164-67 (1986)(irrational decision to waive Miranda rights does not invalidate waiver); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316-17 (defendant's ignorance of consequences of decision
does not vitiate'voluntariness).
83. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 629-30 (postarraignment request for counsel invokes sixth
amendment protection); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-401 (1977)(sixth amendment
guarantees right to counsel at postarraignment interrogation); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 205-07 (1964)(accused entitled to counsel after initiation of adversarial proceedings).
84. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 631, 633-35 (1986)(sixth amendment violated
when postindictment interrogation continues without assistance of counsel after defendant expressly invoked right). Jackson requested counsel at his arraignment, but before counsel was
actually appointed, Jackson was interrogated and made incriminating statements which were
used against him at trial. Id. at 628. The Court held that police initiated interrogations, occurring after the accused invokes his sixth amendment right, invalidate any waiver given for
that interrogation session. Id. at 636. Patterson's contention that Jackson invalidates any
waiver where police interrogate postindictment defendants outside the presence of counsel is
erroneous because Jackson clearly requires a request for the assistance of counsel. Patterson v.
Illinois, - U.S. ., - 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2394, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 271 (1988); Jackson, 475 U.S.
at 636; see also Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)(state obligated to afford defendant
sixth amendment protection once right invoked). Moulton, represented by retained counsel,
was induced to make incriminating statements to codefendant Colson, who had previously
consented to wear a recording device for the police. See id. at 164. The Court held that the
undercover agent's deliberate elicitation of inculpatory statements deprived Moulton of his
sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 176-77. Patterson cannot rely on Moulton for support since Moulton, unlike Patterson, invoked the protection of the sixth amendment by re-
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ger the safeguards of the sixth amendment, 8 5 Patterson never requested
counsel prior to or during questioning. 6 Patterson's position is distinguishable from the defendant in Edwards v. Arizona 8 7 who had requested counsel.8 8 The essence of Edwards is to preserve the integrity of the defendant's
choice to communicate directly to the police or to speak through counsel.8 9
Edwards does not stand for the proposition that the defendant can only be
interrogated by police in the presence of counsel even if he never made that
request. 90 Patterson thus misinterpreted the holding of Edwards on which
he relied as a bar to interrogation unless initiated by the accused. 9'

taining counsel. Compare Patterson, _ U.S. at _ 108 S. Ct. at 2394, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 271
(failure to request counsel) with Moulton, 474 U.S. at 162 (defendant retained counsel). Additionally, Patterson's incriminating statements were not deliberately elicited; Patterson volunteered the information upon learning that he had been indicted. Patterson, - U.S. at -, 108
S. Ct. at 2392, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 269; cf Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981)(invocation of right to counsel is significant event); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979)(request for attorney invokes Miranda's fifth amendment protection); Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96, 104 n.10 (1975)(Miranda's procedural safeguards triggered by request for attorney).
85. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 631, 633-35 (defendant's request for counsel at arraignment
invoked sixth amendment protection); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)(sixth
amendment safeguard of attorney-client privilege effective once accused retains counsel).
86. Patterson, _ U.S. at __ 108 S. Ct. at 2394, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 271.
87. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
88. See Patterson, _ U.S. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 2394, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 271 (discussing
Patterson's failure to request counsel); see also Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484 (1981)(defendant's
request for counsel bars further interrogation unless initiated by defendant). Edwards was
arrested on burglary, robbery and murder charges, informed of his rights under Miranda and
interrogated. Id. at 478. Questioning ceased when Edwards requested an attorney, but resumed the following day, in the absence of counsel. Id. at 480. The Court held that when an
accused invokes the right to counsel he shall not be subjected to further interrogation until
counsel is present, unless the accused initiates further exchanges, conversations, or communication with the police. Id. at 484-85.
89. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)(rule bars interrogation after
defendant requests counsel unless defendant initiates confession). This holding expressly protects the defendant's freedom to choose the manner in which he deals with government officials. Id.
90. See id. at 484-85 (interrogation barred until requested counsel has been made available or defendant initiates communication). The Edwards Court did not hold that all interrogations are prohibited merely because the sixth amendment had attached, independent of a
request for counsel. Id.; see also Patterson, _ U.S. at _, 108 S. Ct. at 2394, 101 L. Ed. 2d at
271 (explaining Edwards); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 640 (1986)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (opposing extension of Edwards to sixth amendment context).
108 S. Ct. 2389, 2394, 101 L. Ed. 2d
91. Compare Patterson v. Illinois, _ U.S. ....
261, 271 (1988)(rejecting Patterson's argument that Edwards controls instant case) with Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (establishing rule barring interrogations after defendant invokes
right to counsel). Extending Edwards to situations in which the defendant had not requested
the assistance of counsel would void the concept of waiver and disrupt the balance between the
interests of society and the rights of the accused. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 640 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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While the fifth and sixth amendment rights to counsel differ in scope, time
of attachment, and underlying policies, 92 neither is superior.9 3 Because of
the equal treatment attributed to each right, a higher waiver standard purported to lie with the sixth amendment right to counsel is insupportable.94
The Court has applied the same "knowing and intelligent" standard in analyzing the waiver of counsel at custodial interrogations for both fifth and
sixth amendment cases." Traditionally, a pragmatic examination of counsel's usefulness to the accused is applied to the question of sixth amendment
waivers at each stage in the criminal proceedings. 96 Because counsel plays a

92. Compare Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)(sixth amendment right to counsel
arises only after initiation of adversary criminal proceedings) with Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966)(custodial interrogation triggers procedural safeguards necessary to
protect fifth amendment rights). One author views the fifth amendment entitlement as preservative of the accusatorial nature of the American criminal justice system and the sixth amendment right as crucial to the system's adversarial character. See Tomkovicz, Standardsfor
Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 979-94
(1986)(comparing origins and purposes of fifth and sixth amendments). For a discussion of
fifth and sixth amendment right to counsel differences, see generally Note, Proposed Requirements for Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 363-65
(1982)(discussing threshold issues and waiver requirements); Recent Decision, Constitutional
Law - Right to Counsel - Waiver of Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Requires that a
Federal Defendant be Brought before a JudicialOfficer for an Explanation of the Content and
Significance of the Right to Counsel and of the Indictment - United States v. Mohabir, 624
F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980), 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 400-02 (198 1)(historical examination
of each right).
93. See Patterson,- U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2397, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275 (caselaw does not
support theory that more stringent standard exists for sixth amendment right); see also Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 385, 430 n.1 (1977)(White, J., dissenting) (important question not
whether right arises under Massiah or Miranda but waiver itself); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 463 (1986)(Stevens, J., dissenting) (right to attorney during interrogation not dependent
on whether source of right is fifth, sixth, or combination of amendments).
94. Compare Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)(adopting intentional relinquishment of known right as sixth amendment standard for waiver of right to counsel) with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (adopting Zerbst's high standards for waiver of fifth amendment
entitlement to counsel).
95. See, e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632-33 (1986) (sixth amendment); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (fifth amendment); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
476, 482 (1981)(fifth amendment); Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404 (sixth amendment).
96. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465 (waiver of right to counsel at trial imposes serious duty
upon trial judge to insure valid waiver). But see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 313-20
(1973)(no right to counsel at postindictment photographic display identification). Compare
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975)(defendant desiring to proceed pro se must be
made fully aware of disadvantages and dangers of decision to waive right to counsel) with
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)(scientific examinations of blood and fingerprints not critical stages therefore no sixth amendment right to counsel attaches). Thus, the
usefulness and need for counsel at each particular stage in a criminal proceeding defines the
requisite level of knowledge necessary to waive the right to counsel. Patterson v. Illinois, U.S. 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2398-99, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 276-77 (1988).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 20 [2022], No. 2, Art. 9

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:473

limited role in interrogations, essentially advising the accused to answer only
certain questions or to remain silent,9 7 counsel's "usefulness" at postindictment questioning is equivalent to his "usefulness" at preindictment custodial
interrogation.9" Miranda warnings, sufficient to warn the defendant of the
right to counsel during custodial interrogations, are therefore sufficient to
inform the accused of the right to counsel during postindictment
questioning.99
Patterson is significant because the Court formally adopted sixth amendment right to counsel warnings for postindictment interrogations. The standard Miranda warnings are easily administered and effectively inform the
accused of thle right to counsel independent of the source of that right. The
Court correctly foreclosed unnecessary expansion of the right to counsel.
While not immune from criticism, the result strikes a fair balance between
the rights of the accused and the interests of society in effective law
enforcement.
David M. Shearer

97. See Patterson,- U.S. at - n.6, _, 108 S. Ct. at 2395-96 n.6, 2398, 101 L. Ed. 2d at
273 n.6, 276 (counsel's role at postindictment questioning is substantially less useful than role
at trial). There are functions counsel could fulfill during an interrogation, such as explaining
the charges, examining the indictment, and plea bargaining, any of which could have some
effect on the outcome at trial. Id. at -_, 108 S. Ct. at 2403, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 282-83 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
98. Id. at __, 108 S. Ct. at 2398, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 276.
99. Id. at __ nn. 12,13, 108 U.S. at 2398 nn.12,13, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 276-77 nn.12,13. This
is supported by the fact that Mirandaexplicitly adopted the sixth amendment, Zerbst standard
for analyzing waivers of right to counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
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